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CASENOTES
KSR: IT WAS NOT A GHOST
James W. Dabneyt
Abstract
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted an
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 that differed substantially from
prior Supreme Court interpretations of the statute. Under Federal
Circuit precedent, the act offiling of a patent application was said to
vest in the applicant a provisional entitlement to patent protection for
any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that the
applicant disclosed and claimed to be his or her "invention." Under
this view, § 103 functioned as a mere proviso to a presupposed
entitlement to patent protection. Federal Circuit precedent enforced
this supposed entitlement by means of a judicially-devised "test, "
referred to as the "teaching-suggestion-motivation test, " under which
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and United States
courts were said to lack authority to hold that a patent claim was
invalid under § 103 in the absence of some proven teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings
in the particular manner claimed. In KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court disapproved core premises of
Federal Circuit precedent interpreting § 103. KSR reaffirms that §
103 did not abrogate, but to the contrary "codified" the pre-existing
legal standard for patentability that the Court had announced in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. KSR also makes clear that courts, not
juries, have responsibility for determining the preemptive effect of
undisputed prior art under § 103.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,' the Supreme Court
reheard a debate over the nature and meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 that
was thought to have been settled in Graham v. John Deere Co. 2 and
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,3 but was
reignited by a 1983 decision of Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.4 The issue was whether Congress, in enacting § 103 in 1952,
had codified, or as some persisted in arguing, had abrogated the legal
standard of patentability that the Supreme Court announced in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood and applied in numerous patent cases
decided between 1851 and 1952 including Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.
6
Adhering to its previous treatments of § 103, the Court in KSR
held that § 103 "codified" the "bar on patents claiming obvious
subject matter established in Hotchkiss, 7 and further, that "[n]either
the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this
Court's earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the
1. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
2. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,4-5, 16-17, 19(1966).
3. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60, 60-63 (1969)
(citing and applying Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950) and Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938)). See also
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1976) (claimed subject matter held "not
patentable under standards appropriate for a combination patent") (citing and quoting Great At!.,
340 U.S. at 152).
4. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("There is
no warrant for judicial classification of patents, whether into 'combination' patents and some
other unnamed and undefined class or otherwise.... Reference to 'combination' patents is,
moreover, meaningless.") (citing Judge Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention"
Requirement, I A.P.L.A. Q.J. 26, 32 (1972)). In the cited practice article, the author, one of the
original Judges of the Federal Circuit, stated, "my position is that Congress, enacting the Patent
Act of 1952, did replace the A&P Case reasoning... " Id. at 32-33. As one leading patent law
casebook candidly put it, "[i]n its early decisions, the Federal Circuit essentially repudiated the
holdings of Anderson 's-Black Rock and Sakraida." MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 345 (2d ed. 2003). Notably, this casebook was co-authored by
Judge Randall R. Rader who currently sits on the Federal Circuit.
5. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851).
6. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). See
infra notes 20-21, 141 and accompanying text.
7. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007) (citing Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1852)).
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prior art."8 In the particular case before it, the Court held that
"fundamental misunderstandings" in Federal Circuit precedent had
led the lower court "to apply a test inconsistent with our patent law
decisions." 9 Prior art references that the Federal Circuit held did not
make out "a prima facie case of obviousness,"' 0 were held by the
Supreme Court to mandate summary judgment of invalidity."'
The KSR decision restates and reaffirms, as patent law
"doctrine,"' 12 a series of principles that courts and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (the "PTO") may properly draw on
when considering whether subject matter claimed in a patent or patent
application should be deemed "non-obvious subject matter" under §
103(a). 13 The proven existence of a "teaching, suggestion, or
motivation" to make particular claimed subject matter remains one
basis on which a judgment of invalidity may rest, but it is only one.
Courts and the PTO must also consider the degree of skill needed to
devise claimed means of solving an objectively defined problem, 14
and may conclude that claimed subject matter "would have been
obvious" if, for example, it "[involved] the mere application of a
known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement."'
' 5
The KSR decision calls into question various procedural aspects
of Federal Circuit precedent applying § 103, including the Federal
Circuit rule that a patent litigant has no right to a court's, as distinct
from a lay jury's, independent judgment on the ultimate legal
8. Id. at 1739 (citing Great At!., 340 U.S. at 152). The KSR decision quotes and applies
the same passage from Great Atd. as the Court had quoted and applied in Sakraida and
Anderson 's-Black Rock.
9. Id. at 1743.
10. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2005), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
11. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743 ("When we apply the standards we have explained to the
instant facts, claim 4 must be found obvious.").
12. Id. at 1739.
13. Id. at 1739-42. See infra notes 108 - 135 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 1741-42 ("Neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the
patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim.").
15. Id. at 1740. See also Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35
U.S.C. 103 in View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72
Fed. Reg. 57526 (Oct. 10, 2007). In the PTO Examination Guidelines, "[ulse of known
technique to improve similar device (methods, or products) in the same way," id. at 57529, and
"[a]pplying a known technique to known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to
yield predictable results," id., are expressly listed as two of seven approved "Rationales" for
rejecting patent claims under § 103. "Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art
that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify prior art references or to combine prior art
reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention," id., is now but one, non-exclusive basis
on which PTO Examiners may ground a legal conclusion of invalidity.
2007]
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question of patent validity.1 6 If faithfully applied, the KSR decision
should restore the traditional role of United States District Judges in
making legal determinations of patent claim validity under § 103, and
should thereby greatly reduce the cost and uncertainty of patent
infringement litigation.
II. THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF "NON-OBVIOUS
SUBJECT MATTER": 1851-1982
The concept of limiting patents to "non-obvious subject matter"
traces to the Supreme Court's decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.
17
In that case, the Court held invalid a patent that claimed a method of
manufacturing knobs (e.g., doorknobs) whose end portions were
made of clay or porcelain, The method included steps for fastening a
knob to a threaded "shank." The exact same fastening method had
previously been used to make knobs having wooden or metal ends;
the alleged innovation was applying the pre-existing fastening method
to make knobs of clay or porcelain.' 8 In rendering its judgment of
patent invalidity, the Court formulated and applied the following legal
standard:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application
of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the
improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the
inventor. 19
Between 1851 and 1952, the Supreme Court frequently
considered and determined the merits of invalidity defenses to claims
for alleged patent infringement, and in so doing, frequently
considered and determined whether particular subject matter claimed
in an issued patent was sufficiently innovative as to satisfy the general
condition for patentability set forth in Hotchkiss.20 This sizable body
16. See R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[I]t
is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury."). See infra notes 147-157, 167-
172 and accompanying text.
17. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1851).
18. Id. at 249-250.
19. Id. at 266.
20. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151-
52 (1950) (invalidating patent claims describing supermarket check-out counter structures);
Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U.S. 291 (1948) (invalidating patent claims describing
[ ol. 24
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of "judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition" 2'
encompassed diverse types of alleged inventions in diverse
technological fields, and represented a substantial public investment
in the development of patent law.
In 1952, Congress repealed the Patent Act of 187022 and enacted
the current Patent Act of 1952, one of whose provisions, 35 U.S.C. §
103, was headed "Conditions for patentability; nonobvious subject
matter." The Supreme Court first interpreted the new § 103 in its
1966 Graham decision. Consistently with what was, at the time, the
perspiration inhibiting composition); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S.
275 (1944) (upholding patent claims describing a leak-proof battery); Standard Brands, Inc. v.
National Green Yeast Corp., 308 U.S. 34 (1939) (invalidating patent claims describing process
for manufacturing compressed yeast); Essex Razor Blade Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co.,
299 U.S. 94 (1936) (invalidating claims describing safety razor and blade configuration);
Paramount Publix Corp. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464 (1935) (invalidating patent
claims describing a process for producing a combined sound and picture positive film);
DeForest Radio Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 283 U.S. 664 (1931) (invalidating patent claims
describing vacuum tube); Saranac Automatic Mach. Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S.
704 (1931) (invalidating patent claims describing machinery for making box blanks); Temco
Elec. Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319 (1928) (upholding patent claims describing
shock absorber); Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177 (1925) (invalidating patent
claims describing apparatus for transporting wet concrete); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota &
Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) (upholding validity of patent claims describing paper
making machinery); Berlin Mills Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 254 U.S. 156 (1920)
(invalidating patent claims describing a lard-like food product consisting of an incompletely
hydrogenized vegetable oil); R.R. Supply Co v. Elyria Iron & Steel Co., 244 U.S. 285 (1917)
(invaliding patent claims describing railroad tie plates); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber
Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911) (upholding patent claims describing rubber tired wheel design);
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S.. 366 (1909) (upholding patent claims describing
method of making expanded sheet metal); Carnegie Steel Co. v.,Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403
(1902) (upholding patent claim describing method of mixing molten pig metal); Mast, Foos &
Co. v. Stover Mfg Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900) (invaliding patent claim describing apparatus for
ivindmill-driven pitman am); Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Fenton Metallic Mfg. Co., 174 U.S.
492 (1899) (invalidating patent claims describing configuration of book storage case); Keystone
Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139 (upholding validity of patent claim describing improved corn
sheller); Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221 (1893) (invalidating patent claim describing adjustable
dress form); Krementz v. S. Cottle Co., 148 U.S. 556 (1893) (upholding validity of patent claim
describing improved collar button); Hoyt v. Home, 145 U.S. 302 (1892) (upholding validity of
patent describing rag engine for paper-making); Butler v. Steckel, 137 U.S. 21 (1890)
(invalidating patent claim describing die for making pretzels); Consol. Safety-Valve Co. v.
Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157 (1885) (upholding validity of patent claim
describing steam safety valve); Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120 (1878) (upholding validity of
patent claim describing machine for making paper bags). It is to be emphasized that the
foregoing are merely examples of the Supreme Court's numerous "judicial precedents
embracing the Hotchkiss condition." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
21. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
22. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (repealed 1952).
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overwhelming majority view of the Courts of Appeals, 23 Graham
expressly rejected arguments that § 103 was purportedly "intended to
sweep away judicial precedents and to lower the level of
patentability. '24 Graham held, to the contrary, that "the section was
intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the
Hotchkiss condition, with congressional directions that inquiries into
the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a
prerequisite to patentability." 25
Three years later, in Anderson 's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co., 26 the Court granted certiorari to consider the question
whether "the holding on the matter of aggregations in patents in
Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, is
still the law ....,27 The answer was "yes." 28 Anderson 's-Black Rock
reversed a judgment of infringement and held a patent claim invalid
under § 103, applying what it called "the test of validity of
combination patents '2 9 and reiterating that § 103 was intended
"merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the
Hotchkiss condition. 30
23. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG.,
EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION, STUDY NO. 7, (Comm. Print
1958), cited in Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 n.9.
24. Graham, 383 U.S. at 16. At the time of the Graham decision, there were some -
including the late Giles S. Rich, then a judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A.") - who argued that the enactment of § 103 had purportedly effected a radical
change in United States patent law. In a 1964 speech entitled "The Vague Concept of
'Invention' as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent Act," Judge Rich criticized lawyers who
had "persuaded a number of courts that it [§ 103] made no change whatever but was 'mere
codification."' See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of 35 U.S.C. 103 at Appendix A, Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Nos. 11, 37, 43), 1965 WL 115655. "Mere codification"
was, however, exactly how the Supreme Court interpreted § 103 in Graham. See Graham, 383
U.S. at 17 ("[T]he section was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents
embracing the Hotchkiss condition .... ).
25. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Accord Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1975)
("This standard [Hotchkiss) was enacted in 1952 by Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 103 as a
codification of judicial precedents ...."); Dann v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1975) ("As a
judicial test, 'invention' - i.e., 'an exercise of the inventive faculty,' McClain v. Ortmayer, 141
U.S. 419, 427 (1891) - has long been regarded as an absolutely prerequisite to patentability ....
However, it was only in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of 'uniformity and definiteness,'
articulated the requirement in a statute, framing it as a requirement of 'nonobviousness."').
26. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
27. Petitioner's Brief Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit at 4, Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57
(1969) (No. 45), 1969 WL 120144, *4.
28. See Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 60.
29. Id. at 60 (citing and applying Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Wamer Corp., 303 U.S.
545, 549 (1938)).
30. Id. at 62 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17).
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In each of the Court's precedents applying § 103 prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, the Court cited and relied on pre-
codification precedents when assessing whether subject matter
claimed in a patent application or an issued patent should be deemed
an "invention" or "non-obvious subject matter."' The Court's pre-
Federal Circuit precedents also consistently interpreted § 103 as
specifying one of three "conditions for patentability '32  whose
satisfaction was a "prerequisite to patentability. '33 Pre-1952 subtests,
such as "the test of validity of combination patents, 34 continued to be
applied as particularized applications of what the Court called "the
'functional approach' of Hotchkiss" that § 103 "codified. 3 5
In general, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, § 103 and "the
'functional approach' of Hotchkiss" both required that a court (a)
posit an objectively defined result to be achieved (e.g., making a clay
31. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1975) (quoting Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 267 (1850), and Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225-226 (1976)
(quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891), and citing Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (II
How.) at 248, and Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42 (1935), and
Sharp v. Stamping Co., 103 U.S. 250 (1880)); Anderson 's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 60-63 (citing
Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (II How.) at 248, and quoting Great Atl., 340 U.S. at 153, and Lincoln
Eng'g, 303 U.S. at 549); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (citing and
distinguishing Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945)); Graham,
383 U.S. at 36 (citing Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900)).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 103 is headed: "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject
matter".
33. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. See Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279 ("It has long been clear that
the Constitution requires that there be some 'invention' to be entitled to patent protection ....
[t]his standard [Hotchkiss] was enacted in 1952 by Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 103 'as a
codification of judicial precedents ... with congressional directions that inquiries into the
obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.")
(quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17). See also Dann, 425 U.S. at 230 n.4 ("commercial success
without invention will not make patentability" (quoting Great Atl., 340 U.S. at 153));
Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61-63 ("The patent standard is basically constitutional";
claimed subject matter "was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard"; "more than
that [commercial success] is needed for invention"); Adams, 383 U.S. at 48 ("novelty and
nonobviousness - as well as utility - are separate tests of patentability and all must be satisfied
in a valid patent"); Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 ("the § 103 condition ... is but one of three
conditions, each of which must be satisfied"); Gardner v. Herz, 118 U.S. 180, 191 (1886)
("under art. I, sec. 8, subdivision 8 of the constitution, a patentee 'must be an inventor and he
must have made a discovery."' (quoting Thompson v. Boisslier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885));
Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (II How.) at 267 (holding that certain "degree of skill and ingenuity
constitute essential elements of every invention" and that claimed subject matter was not
patentable because it constituted "the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.").
34. Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282 (quoting Anderson 's-Black, 396 U.S. at 60).
35. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 1746 (2007) (quoting Graham,
383 U.S. at 12).
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doorknob having a threaded shank),36 and then (b) form a legal
judgment whether, in light of pre-existing knowledge and technology,
the conception of claimed means for achieving the posited result
37
required "more ingenuity and skill... than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business." 38 This approach to
determining patent claim validity under § 103 is very similar to the
36. Under Supreme Court patent precedent, one may not patent a "result" as
distinguished from practical means for achieving a desired result. See, e.g., Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) ("A claim covers and secures a process, a
machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design, but never the function or result of
either, nor the scientific explanation of their operation") (emphasis added) (quoting 6 E.
LIPSCOMB, WALKER ON PATENTS § 21:17 (3d ed. 1985)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182
n.7 (1981) ("It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing
a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for.the result or effect itself.")
(quoting Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1854)). For purposes of validity
analysis under § 103(a), the result to be achieved is defined objectively by reference to "the
prior art" and "the subject matter sought to be patented," not by reference to what a given
applicant might have subjectively thought was the result that he or she was pursuing or the
degree of difficulty that he or she subjectively perceived. A patent applicant may not be aware
of the closest prior art, or may describe an alleged invention using claim words that are so broad
as to leave little or no difference between the claimed subject matter and the prior art. See KSR,
127 S. Ct. at 1741-42 ("neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee
controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim.").
37. Under Supreme Court patent precedent, the validity of a patent claim "must be
ascertained, not from a consideration of the purposes sought to be accomplished, but of the
means pointed out for the attainment thereof; and if such means, adapted to effect the desired
results, do not involve invention, they can derive no aid or support from the end which was
sought to be secured." Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1893). See also In re Comiskey,
499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (in case where patent claim recited a computer "system" for
implementing a lawyer's allegedly novel idea of providing for mandatory arbitration of disputes
concerning "unilateral documents" such as wills and trusts, the question of validity under § 103
turned on "whether the addition of general purpose computers or modem communications
devices to Comiskey's otherwise unpatentable mental process would have been non-obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art," not on whether conception of the underlying legal idea
would have been obvious).
38. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (II How.) at 265 quoted in Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279. See, e.g.,
Graham, 383 U.S. at 24-25 (in view of prior art, ordinarily skilled person would have
immediately seen claimed subject matter as means of achieving desired "free-flexing" objective;
patent claims held invalid); Adams, 383 U.S. at 42-52 (in view of prior art, ordinarily skilled
person would not have seen claimed subject matter as means of achieving desired water-
activated constant-voltage battery; patent claims held valid); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 333-35 (1945) (in view of prior art, ordinarily skilled person
would have been capable of devising claimed ink composition as means of achieving desired
drying properties; patent claims held invalid); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co.,
321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (in view of prior art and secondary considerations, ordinarily skilled
person would not have seen claimed subject matter as means of achieving desired leak proof
battery; patent claims held valid); Essex Razor Blade Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 299
U.S. 94, 98 (1936) (in view of prior art, claimed non-circular opening in razor blade was a
"choice... between alternative means obvious to any mechanic"; patent claims held invalid).
2007] KSR IT WAS NOT A GHOST
"problem and solution" approach to patentability that has long
prevailed in much of Europe.39
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S REINTERPRETATION OF § 103: 1982-
2005
Commencing on October 1, 1982, appeals from district court
judgments in civil actions "arising under" federal patent law were
diverted from the regional circuits to a newly-created, intermediate
appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 40 As one
of its first official acts, the Federal Circuit bound itself to follow all of
the holdings that the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A.") had announced during a fifty-plus year period ending
September 30, 1982. 4'
One C.C.P.A. precedent that the Federal Circuit bound itself to
follow was In re Warner.42 In that case, the C.C.P.A. had stated:
[T]he precise language of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that '[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless,' concerning novelty and unobviousness,
clearly places a burden of proof on the Patent Office which
requires it to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an
application under sections 102 and 103.
43
39. See CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 120-
21 (A. Rodes et al. 5
th ed. 2006) (describing "problem and solution approach" to determining
whether claimed subject matter reflects an "inventive step"); Freidrich-Karl Beier, The Inventive
Step in its Historical Development, 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 301, 304
(1986) ("[T]he so-called patentability requirement was invented by the Americans, in particular
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case [Hotchkiss].").
40. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829
(2002). The Federal Circuit is "a specialized court," Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163
(1999), whose jurisdiction is limited to the particular matters set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).
41. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("[T]he
holdings of our predecessor courts, the United States Court of Claims and the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, announced by those courts before the close of business
September 30, 1982, shall be binding as precedent in this court"). In 1966, when PTO decisions
to refuse patents were subject to review by the C.C.P.A., the Supreme Court had "observed a
notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts."
Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. With the South Corp. decision, the "standards applied by the Patent
Office" abruptly displaced the standards that had been "applied by the courts" up until that time.
For a provocative treatment of the political debate that preceded the creation of the Federal
Circuit and the impact of early Federal Circuit decisions on United States patent law, consult
Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 208 (2006).
42. In re Warner , 379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967). See, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (following the standard announced in In re Warner).
43. In re Wamer, 379 F.2d at 1016.
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This seemingly obscure procedural ruling was, in reality, an aspect of
a radical argument for "sweep[ing] away judicial precedents" 44 that
has been presented, and expressly rejected, in Graham. Its adoption
by the Federal Circuit in 1982 had major substantive ramifications
that ultimately led to the KSR decision some twenty-five years later.
Under the interpretation of § 103 announced in Warner and
subsequently embraced by the Federal Circuit, a patent applicant's
subjective statement of belief that he or she was "the original and first
inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or improvement thereof, for which he [or she] solicits a
patent,''45 was said to trigger an entitlement to patent protection that
the PTO could not rightly refuse unless the PTO came forward with
"evidence" that the C.C.P.A. deemed sufficient to make out what
came to be called a "a prima facie case of obviousness. 4 6 If the PTO
failed to locate and produce "evidence" that established a "prima facie
case of obviousness" with respect to a claim made in a patent
application, then, under C.C.P.A. and pre-KSR Federal Circuit
precedent, the PTO was said to have no choice but to allow the
claim.47
As thus interpreted in Warner and its progeny, § 103 did not
state a condition for patentability that a patent applicant had to satisfy
before a claim to patent protection could be allowed, but rather
purportedly stated a condition for challenges to patentability that the
Government had to satisfy before a claim to patent protection could
properly be denied. The sole legal authority cited in Warner for its
interpretation of § 103 was: "see Graham and Adams., 48 In fact,
nowhere in the Supreme Court's Graham and Adams decisions was it
held or intimated that, when examining an "alleged new invention,
''9
the Government was required to accept an applicant's self-interested
claim that he or she was an "inventor" of "non-obvious subject
matter" unless the Government succeeded in carrying a particular
"burden of proof." On the contrary, both cases held that § 103
44. Graham, 383 U.S. at 16.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (emphasis added).
46. Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472.
47. See, e.g., In re Carleton, 599 F.2d 1021, 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
48. Warner, 379 F.2d at 1016.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention .... ) (emphasis added).
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prescribes a "test of patentability," 50  not a test of challenges to
patentability.
In furtherance of the interpretation of § 103 articulated in
Warner, the C.C.P.A. applied what came to be called the "teaching-
suggestion-motivation test" 51 for determining the sufficiency of
evidence relied on as support for a legal conclusion of invalidity
under § 103.52 Under this "test," the PTO was said to be precluded
from holding that two or more prior art references rendered a patent
claim invalid under § 103 in the absence of "some 'teaching,
suggestion, or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the
manner claimed., 53 With the Federal Circuit's wholesale adoption of
C.C.P.A. precedent in 1982, the "teaching-suggestion-motivation
test" of challenges to patentability was suddenly extended to the
determination of invalidity defenses to claims for alleged patent
infringement brought in federal courts.
54
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of § 103 had the practical
effect of greatly expanding the scope of what could be patented as an
"invention" in the United States. That which a person is skilled
enough to make encompasses far more than what a person might be
"taught," "suggested" or "motivated" to make at a point in time. 55 In
50. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S.
39, 48 (1966).
51. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 286 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007). See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[O]ur predecessor court
was the first to articulate the motivation-suggestion-teaching test"). Some form of the "teaching-
suggestion-motivation test" pre-dated the Warner decision. See, e.g., In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955,
956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
52. It bears emphasis that the "teaching-suggestion-motivation test," as developed and
applied by the C.C.P.A. and the Federal Circuit, was not a test of whether claimed subject matter
constituted an "invention" or qualified for patent protection in the first instance, but rather was a
test of whether evidence submitted against a patent claim was sufficient to permit a court or the
PTO to draw a legal conclusion that of invalidity under § 103. The "test" purported to be a
severe constraint on the authority of courts and the PTO to form legal judgments.
53. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007).
54. See, e.g., ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("teachings of [prior art] references can be combined only if there is some suggestion or
incentive to do so.").
55. One outgrowth of the "teaching-suggestion-motivation test" was the first generation
of so-called "business method" patents, which typically disclosed computer systems that
differed from prior art systems only in the results they were programmed or configured to
provide. Under pre-KSR Federal Circuit precedent, the PTO was said to lack authority to
disallow a patent on novel claimed apparatus or methods, no matter how technologically trivial,
unless it could "prove" the existence of some "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to make the
particular claimed subject matter. As "[i]n many fields it may be there is little discussion of
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the context of infringement litigation, moreover, the Federal Circuit
announced a series of procedural rules that greatly magnified the
impact of its interpretation of § 103.
In 1983, the Federal Circuit announced that a person asserting a
defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 282(2) bore the burden of
proving all facts relevant to the defense by evidence that was "clear
and convincing."5 6 No authority was cited for this broad proposition,
and it was (and remains) very much in tension with Supreme Court
precedent.57  In numerous cases including Graham, Adams,
Anderson's-Black Rock, and Sakraida, the Supreme Court has
determined the merits of invalidity defenses to patent infringement
claims without subjecting the factual predicates of those defenses to a
"clear and convincing" evidence burden of proof. As the KSR case
illustrates, moreover, invalidity defenses are frequently based on
evidence that has never previously been presented to, or considered
by, the PTO.58 Hence, even if deference to an administrative agency's
fact finding could justify a heightened evidentiary burden in some
obvious techniques or combinations," KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741
(2007), the "teaching-suggestion-motivation test" often had the anomalous effect of increasing
the patentability of claimed subject matter in proportion to its technological triviality.
56. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In the law of
evidence, the phrase "clear and convincing" evidence connotes evidence that "place[s] in the
ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of [a litigant's] factual contentions are
'highly probable."' Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (quoting C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 320 at 679 (1954)).
57. The Court has stated that as a general matter, "[b]ecause the preponderance of the
evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we
presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless
'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake."' Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286 (1991) (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)).
Examples of "particularly important individual interests or rights" include parental custody
rights and citizenship rights. Herman & McClean, 459 U.S. at 387-90.
58. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737 (noting that in deciding to issue the patent at issue in the
KSR case, "the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point.").
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cases, 59 such a rationale would not support imposition of a "clear and
convincing evidence" burden in most cases.
60
In further procedural developments, pre-KSR Federal Circuit
precedent held that the existence of a "[m]otivation to combine" prior
art references was a "question of fact,",61 and that a person accused of
infringement had no right to independent judicial, as distinct from lay
jury, determination of whether subject matter claimed in a patent
should be deemed "non-obvious subject matter" as a legal matter.62 In
addition, pre-KSR Federal Circuit precedent held that when a lay jury
rendered a verdict on the ultimate question of patent validity, post-
verdict or appellate review was limited to "re-creating the facts as
they may have been found by the jury, and.., applying the Graham
factors to the evidence of record .... This meant, in practical
terms, that between 1983 and 2005, a defendant asserting a defense of
59. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934), is sometimes cited
as authority for imposing a "clear and convincing" burden of proof with respect to "certain
facts" proffered in support of an invalidity defense. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Radio Corp. for the proposition that
"certain facts in patent litigation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.") (emphasis
added). Radio Corp. involved an attempt to re-litigate an issue of inventorship that had
previously been determined in a contested adversarial proceeding among the rival claimants.
Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 3-6. Such a situation is very different from the usual case, in which an
asserted patent is procured ex parte and the facts relied upon to establish invalidity were never
the subject of any prior administrative or judicial consideration.
60. An alternative rationale for imposing a heightened evidentiary burden on proponents
of a patent invalidity defense has been articulated in cases where the defense rests on "oral
testimony.., in the absence of models, drawings or kindred evidence .... " T.H. Symington
Co. v. Nat'l Malleable Casting Co., 250 U.S. 383, 386 (1919). Such evidence has been held
"open to grave suspicion; particularly if the testimony be taken after a lapse of years from the
time of the alleged invention." Id. But such cases are rare; in the "usual" patent case, prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, the sounder view in the lower federal courts was: "a
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to establish invalidity." Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522
F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975); accord Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969)
("[l]n the usual case a preponderance of the evidence determines the issue.").
61. Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
62. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(where jury returns a verdict on ultimate question of validity, court cannot make independent
determination of that issue); R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1514 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("[l]t is not error to submit the question of obviousness to a jury"). But cf City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 733 (1999) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("A federal court commits error by submitting an issue to a jury over objection,
unless the party seeking the jury determination has a right to a jury trial on the issue.").
63. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
144 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. [Vol. 24
invalidity under § 103 had no assurance that any court, at any level,
would ever give the defense any independent consideration.64
The net effect of pre-KSR Federal Circuit precedent was to inject
a strong bias into the process of determining questions of patent claim
validity under § 103. The first years of the Federal Circuit coincided
with a spectacular increase in the percentage of cases in which patent
claims withstood invalidity challenges in federal court litigation.
65
Prior to the Supreme Court's October 2005 call for the views of the
Solicitor General in KSR, the Federal Circuit had never once applied
the Supreme Court's reasoning or holdings in.Anderson 's-Black Rock,
Dann, or Sakraida.6 6 One leading patent law casebook noted in 2003:
"In its early decisions, the Federal Circuit essentially repudiated the
holdings of Anderson 's-Black Rock and Sakraida.6 7
IV. THE KSR LITIGATION: 2002-2006
KSR International Co., a Tier 1 supplier of pedal systems to
vehicle manufacturers including Ford Motor Company and General
Motors Corporation, was sued in 2002 by a competitor, Teleflex Inc.
and its patent holding company subsidiary (collectively, "Teleflex"),
for alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565B1 entitled
"Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control" (the
"Engelgau patent"). 68 The alleged "invention ' 69 disclosed in the
64. E.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(affirming jury verdict on ultimate question of patent validity on the basis that there was
"substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of nonobviousness," specifically, expert
testimony regarding a lack of hypothetical "motivation" to modify a prior art computer system
to behave as claimed in asserted patent), rev'don other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
65. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338 (2003) ("[I]n the first five years of the new court the
percentage of cases in which the validity of a challenged patent was upheld increased
enormously over the pre-Federal Circuit era," going from 35 percent to "a weighted average of
67 percent for the first ten years of the Federal Circuit").
66. See Brief for Petitioner at 28-32, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727
(2007) (No. 14-1350), 2006 WL 2515631, *28-32.
67. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 345 (2d ed.
2003).
68. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l, 298 F. Supp.2d 581, 585 (E.D. Mich 2003).
69. The word "invention" is a term of art in patent law. As used in the Patent Act, the
word "invention" refers to "a concept that is complete," Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55,
66 (1998), and that falls within one of the subject matter categories listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101,
i.e., is a concept that constitutes "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." An "invention" can be
made and exist long before it is described in a patent application. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68-69
(holding patent invalid "because the invention had been on sale for more than one year in this
country before he [the alleged inventor] filed his patent application").
KSR IT WAS NOT A GHOST
Engelgau patent was said to have been made on or about February 14,
1998, by one Stephen J. Engelgau of Royal Oak, Michigan.70 Two
embodiments of the alleged "invention" made by Mr. Engelgau are
depicted in Figure 4 of the Engelgau patent, reproduced below:
Q1
In the terminology of the Engelgau patent, the above figures
depict an adjustable pedal assembly (22) that comprises a pedal arm
(14), a tubular guide rod (62), a bearing member (66), and a bracket
(46), all of which are pivotally mounted on a support (44) for
actuating an engine throttle. 7' When a force is applied to the pedal
arm (such as when a driver steps on the pedal pad), the entire
assembly (22) rotates about a pivot axis that is defined by two pivot
shafts (24, 38), thereby either pulling a cable (not shown) via optional
cable claw (78) or rotating the internal rotor of a pedal position sensor
(42).72 When an applied force is removed from the pedal arm (such as
when a driver eases up or takes his or her foot off of the pedal), a
spring (68) urges the pedal arm back toward its resting position. 73
Adjustment of the resting position of the pedal arm (14) is
provided by a guide rod (62), a bearing member (66), and a screw
drive mechanism housed in the tubular guide rod (62). Actuation of
70. U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 B 1, at [75] (filed Aug. 22, 2000); KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736.
71. '565 Patent col.2 1.28-col.4 1.61.
72. Id. at col.2 1.28-col.4 1.61.
73. Id. at col.4 11.34-61.
74. Id. at col.4 11.18-34.
2007]
146 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. [Vol. 24
the screw drive mechanism causes the bearing member (66) and the
pedal arm (14) to slide back and forth along the guide rod (62),
thereby adjusting the resting position of the pedal arm (14). 7" The
position of the pivot shafts (34, 38) remains constant while the pedal
arm (14) slides back and forth along the tubular guide rod (62).76
The Engelgau patent concludes with four "claims. 77 The first
three claims, numbered 1-3 in the patent, each described the alleged
"invention" by reference to (1) "a guide member 62"; 78 (2) "a pedal
arm (14) supported on said guide member (62) for rectilinear
movement in fore and aft directions"; 79 and (3) "an electronic control
(28). " 80 The patentee, Teleflex, never alleged that KSR had used the
"invention" that was pointed to by claims 1-3 of the Engelgau
patent.
81
Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent, by contrast, described and
pointed to Mr. Engelgau's alleged "invention" in only the most
general of terms.82 Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent recited (a) an
"adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm movable in fore and
aft directions", and (b) an "electronic control" that was attached to the
pedal assembly's support bracket.83 The recited "adjustable pedal
assembly" was said to encompass "any of various adjustable pedal
75. Id.
76. Id. at col.4 11.9-17.
77. The word "claim" is a term of art in patent law. As used in the Patent Act, the word
"claim" refers to a statutorily required sentence that "particularly point[s] out and distinctly
claim[s] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2000). The allowed "claims" made in a patent application define "the scope of a patent grant,"
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (quoting 3 E. LIPSCOMB,
WALKER ON PATENTS § 11:1, at 280 (3d ed. 1985)), but they are not necessarily accurate as
descriptions of an applicant's actual "invention." Cf Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) ("[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to
capture the essence of a thing in a patent application."); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1949) (invalidating patent claims that "comprehended more
than the invention").
78. '565 Patent col.5 1.26-col.6 1.9.
79. Id. at col.6 11.10-13.
80. Id. at col.6 11.14-15.
81. For an illustration of one of the pedal systems whose sale by KSR was alleged to
infringe the Engelgau patent, consult U.S. Patent No. 6,655,231 fig.2 (filed Feb. 21, 2002). In
the accused KSR pedal systems, a pedal arm is pivotally connected to a goose neck shaped
support arm, and mechanism is provided for causing the pedal arm to rotate about the axis of its
pivot pin.
82. '565 Patent col.6 11.17-36. Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent recalls Judge Learned
Hand's famous observation: "Upon any work,. . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well... " Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930).
83. '565 Patent col.6 11.7-36.
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assemblies known in the art" 84 and the recited "electronic control"
was said to encompass "any of various electronic throttle control
mechanisms known in the art.",85 The alleged innovation described by
this claim was said to lie in the combination of these two pre-existing
components, and specifically, in the decision to attach the claimed
"electronic control" to the pedal assembly's support bracket as
opposed to some other structure.86 The extremely limited nature of the
Engelgau claim 4 "invention" was confirmed by Teleflex's counsel
during the Supreme Court oral argument:
JUSTICE STEVENS: The invention, to use an old-fashioned
term, is the decision of where to put the control.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: That is the extent of the entire
invention.
87
KSR moved in the district court for summary judgment of patent
invalidity on the basis of multiple prior art references, including (a)
U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782 to Asano ("Asano"), which disclosed an
adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm movable in fore and aft
directions; (b) prior art references disclosing electronic controls,
namely, modular pedal position sensors that were designed to engage
an accelerator pedal's pivot shaft; and (c) prior art references showing
electronic controls attached to accelerator pedal support brackets.88
In support of summary judgment, KSR made two alternative
legal arguments. First, KSR contended that claim 4 of the Engelgau
patent was invalid under even the Federal Circuit's then-interpretation
of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 89 Second, KSR contended that claim 4 of the
Engelgau patent was invalid under Supreme Court interpretations of §
103(a) that pre-dated and conflicted with Federal Circuit precedent. 90
In either event, KSR argued that it was not necessary to hold a so-
called "Markman" or "claim construction" hearing apart from the
84. Id. at col.2 11.55-56.
85. Id. at col.3 11.23-24.
86. Id. atcol.1 11.62-64.
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727
(2007) (No. 04-1350).
88. See Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
89. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity at 19-
33, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l, 298 F. Supp.2d 581 (E.D. Mich 2003).
90. Id. at 33-35.
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court's consideration of underlying merits issues to which "claim
construction" might be relevant.
9
'
For purposes of summary judgment of invalidity, KSR urged the
court to assume the accuracy of the plaintiffs' proposed
"construction" of the patent claim language.92 In this way KSR
avoided expensive, time-consuming, and highly uncertain litigation
93
over what eventually proved a moot point, namely, whether the
asserted patent claim language should be "construed" in such a way
as to encompass the prior art, but to exclude the design of the accused
KSR pedal systems (whose design was quite different from that
disclosed in the prior art or the Engelgau patent).94 Unlike the
situation with the accused KSR pedal systems, it was undisputed that
91. See Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 591 ("the Court finds a Markman hearing to be
unnecessary").
92. See id. ("neither party disputes any language of claim 4 in the context of Defendant's
motion for invalidity").
93. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting):
During so called Markman "hearings," which are often longer than jury trials,
parties battle over experts offering conflicting evidence regarding who qualifies
as one of ordinary skill in the art; the meaning of patent terms to that person; the
state of the art at the time of the invention; contradictory dictionary definitions
and which would be consulted by the skilled artisan; the scope of specialized
terms; the problem a patent was solving; what is related or pertinent art; whether
a construction was disallowed during prosecution; how one of skill in the art
would understand statements during prosecution; and on and on.
The name "Markman hearing" comes from Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370 (1996), wherein the Supreme Court held that "the construction of a patent, including terms
of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court." Id. at 372. The recent
phenomenon of "Markman" hearings, however, flows not from the Supreme Court's Markman
decision, but from the Federal Circuit "literal" patent infringement standard which erroneously
conflates the distinct concepts of "invention" and "claim." Cf Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1949) (invalidating patent claims that "comprehended
more than the invention"). Simply stated, there is no necessary correspondence between (a) an
"invention" that a person makes and describes in a patent application, and (b) the meaning of
claim words that an applicant chooses to characterize such an invention. The latter may, or may
not, be accurate or precise in their description of the former. In the author's view, the Federal
Circuit's current interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), exemplified by the Phillips case, is as
divergent from Supreme Court patent precedent as was the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
that the Court disapproved in KSR.
94. See supra note 81. As described in the KSR-owned U.S. Patent No. 6,655,2311B 1, the
accused KSR pedal systems did not include any structure corresponding to the guide rod (62)
and bearing member (66) disclosed in the Engelgau patent, and also did not provide for any
sliding engagement of a pedal arm with a guide member. The mode of operation of the accused
KSR pedal systems was also substantially different from that disclosed in the Engelgau patent.
Rather than have a pedal arm slide back and forth along a guide member, as disclosed in the
Engelgau patent (and in the Asano patent), the accused KSR pedal systems provided a pedal arm
that rotated or swung about a pivot axis located at the end of a goose neck shaped structure.
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the claim phrase, "an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm
movable in fore and aft directions," described the Asano reference
relied on by KSR. 95
In December 2003, the district court (per The Honorable
Lawrence P. Zatkoff, Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Michigan)
granted KSR's motion for summary judgment and held that the
asserted patent claim was invalid under the Federal Circuit's then-
interpretation of § 103(a).96 Teleflex then appealed the district court's
judgment to the Federal Circuit, complaining that the district court
had "diluted beyond recognition the barriers that the Federal Circuit
has erected to a finding of obviousness." 97 In opposing Teleflex's
appeal, KSR once again urged two alternative grounds for affirmance.
First, KSR argued that the award of summary judgment was correct as
a matter of Federal Circuit law.98 Second, KSR argued, the award of
summary judgment was compelled by long-standing Supreme Court
patent precedent to the effect that: "A patent for a combination which
only unites old elements with no change in their respective
functions... obviously withdraws what already is known into the
field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful
men." 99
In an unpublished decision dated January 6, 2005, the Federal
Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case
"for further proceedings on the issue of obviousness, and, if
necessary, proceedings on the issues of infringement and damages."'
00
Although there was no dispute as to any historical fact relevant to the
patentability of the claimed subject matter, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless held that a jury trial was needed to decide a hypothetical
"fact," namely, "whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated, at the time the invention was made, to attach an
electronic control to the support structure of the pedal assembly."''°
95. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1744 (2007) (adopting District
Court's finding that "combining Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within
the scope of claim 4").
96. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
97. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants Teleflex, Inc. and Technology Holding Co. at 4,
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1152).
98. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 27-47, Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x
282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1152).
99. Id. at 47-49 (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976) (quoting
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)).
100. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
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In rendering its judgment, the Federal Circuit in KSR did not cite,
distinguish, or acknowledge the existence of Sakraida or other
analogous Supreme Court patent precedents on which KSR had
relied, even though KSR had devoted an entire section of its appellate
brief to those Supreme Court precedents.
KSR then petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
certiorari and secured what turned out to be an important time and
money-saving stay of further proceedings in the District Court
pending the Supreme Court's decision. On the first day of its October
2005 Term, the Supreme Court issued an Order inviting the Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. After
several months of consideration, the Solicitor General in May 2006
filed a brief that urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and
reverse the Federal Circuit's judgment. In making that
recommendation, the Solicitor General expressly noted that: "KSR
has properly preserved its challenge to the court of appeals' teaching-
suggestion-motivation test by urging in the proceedings below that
this Court's decisions provided an alternative basis for affirmance."1
02
On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court granted KSR's petition for
a writ of certiorari and set the case for hearing during its October
2006 term. The case was orally argued on November 28, 2006.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous, 9-0
decision that reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and held
the asserted claim invalid under § 103(a) as a matter of law. In
reaching this result, the Supreme Court identified a number of
"fundamental misunderstandings" in Federal Circuit precedent that
had "led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent
with our patent law decisions."1
0 3
The Court began its analysis by explicitly "rejecting the rigid
approach of the Court of Appeals." 4 "Throughout this Court's
engagement with the question of obviousness," the Court explained,
"our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test
here."' 10 5 As it had done in Graham, the Court in KSR reaffirmed that
102. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 1455388, *19.
103. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743.
104. Id. at 1739.
105. Id.
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35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is "based on the logic of the earlier decision in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood... and its progeny"; 10 6 that "the principles
laid down in Graham reaffirmed the 'functional approach' of
Hotchkiss ... ,;107 and that basic "premises" of the United States
patent system "led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject
matter established in Hotchkiss and codified in § 103. '08
The Court then proceeded to restate and reaffirm a series of
"principles" of patentability that had underlain the Court's past
treatment of different types of claimed inventions, and that the Court
has now explicitly tied to § 103(a). The "principles" are in the nature
of rules or logical precepts that inform legal analysis of whether
subject matter claimed in an issued patent should, or should not, be
deemed to meet the "non-obvious subject matter" condition for
patentability. 09 The restated "principles" make clear that the
preemptive effect of prior art is a "legal determination" that can be,
and in the KSR case actually was, resolved by way of relatively
inexpensive summary judgment procedure.110 The KSR holding
further makes clear that the PTO and United States courts have - and
always have had - much greater authority to deem patent claims
invalid than the Federal Circuit had acknowledged between 1982 and
at least 2005.1"'
A. Restated Principles of Patentability
The first "principle" reaffirmed in KSR, and now expressly tied
to § 103(a), is: "when a patent 'simply arranges old elements with
each performing the same function it had been known to perform' and
yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the
combination is obvious."'" 2 This principle is reflected in decisions
such as Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,
113
where the Court invalidated patent claims that described paving
106. Id. at 1734.
107. Id. at 1739.
108. Id. at 1746.
109. See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57526
(Oct. 10, 2007).
110. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745-46.
Ill. Id. at 1739-44.
112. Id. at 1740 (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).
113. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969).
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apparatus whose two principal components "in combination did no
more than they would in separate, sequential operation."'' 
4
A second "principle" reaffirmed in KSR, and now expressly tied
to § 103(a), is: "if a technique has been used to improve one device,
and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.""' 5
This principle is reflected in decisions such as Dow Chemical Co. v.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,116 where the Court invalidated
patent claims that described a method of increasing the output of a
well comprising use of a hydrochloric acid solution together with an
agent capable of inhibiting corrosion of metal well equipment, when
substantially the same technique had been used to inhibit corrosion of
other kinds of metal equipment exposed to hydrochloric acid
solutions. This was, in the Court's view, "no more than a mere
application of an old process of inhibition to a new and analogous use
of protecting metal well equipment from corrosion ....
A third "principle" reaffirmed in KSR, and now expressly tied to
§ 103(a), is: "[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor,
design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill
can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its
patentability."' 18 This principle is reflected in decisions such as
Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp.," 9 where
the Court invalidated patent claims that described apparatus for
recording or reproducing sound records comprising a flywheel
yielding a uniform speed of operation, where an exogenous
development - namely, the invention of "talking" motion pictures -
had prompted market demand for the claimed subject matter.
A fourth "principle" reaffirmed in KSR, and now expressly tied
to § 103(a), is:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
114. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Dow Chemical Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320 (1945).
117. Id. at 327.
118. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740 (emphasis added).
119. Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477 (1935).
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anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under § 103.120
This principle is reflected in decisions such as Essex Razor Blade
Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co.,121 where the Court invalidated
patent claims describing a razor blade having "a non-circular
opening" and recesses designed to cooperate with pins for holding the
blade in position, where "[t]he choice" of razor blade configuration
"was one between alternative means obvious to any mechanic."'' 22
A fifth "principle" reaffirmed in KSR, and now expressly tied to
§ 103(a), is: "when the prior art teaches away from combining certain
known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them
is more likely to be nonobvious."'123 This principle is reflected in
decisions such as United States v. Adams, 124 where the Court upheld
patent claims that described a water-activated battery all of whose
components were previously known, but whose combination was one
that prior art teachings had both discouraged and suggested,
erroneously, would not work.
125
Common to all of the restated "principles" is a renewed focus on
the degree of skill needed to devise claimed subject matter coupled
with recognition that "market demand, rather than scientific
literature," may "drive design trends" in a given context. 126 Under
KSR, "a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.' ' 127 If the answer to this threshold question is "no" - that is,
if a patent claim is written in such a way as to encompass subject
matter that constitutes no more than "the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions" - then the claim
may be held invalid under § 103(a) on that basis alone.' 28 The Court
120. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
121. Essex Razor Blade Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 299 U.S. 94 (1936).
122. Id. at 98.
123. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
124. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
125. Id. at 51-52.
126. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
127. Id. at 1740.
128. See, e.g., id. at 1746 ("[M]ounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of the
Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
art"; claim held invalid under § 103); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)
("[T]his patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been
known to perform"; claim held invalid under § 103).
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cited two examples of such invalid claims: "the simple substitution of
one known element for another or the mere application of a known
technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement."'
' 29
On the other hand, if a patent claim is limited to subject matter
that constitutes "more than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions,"'' 30 then the mere fact that
"each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art," is
an insufficient basis for concluding that the claim recites "obvious"
subject matter.' 3' Rather, in such cases, assessment of a patent claim's
validity under § 103(a) .calls for "an expansive and flexible
approach"''32 in which a court may "often" need to consider:
[I]nterrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands
known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and
the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue.
1 33
"Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the
field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent
can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed.' ' 134 And as the KSR case illustrates, the concept of "an
apparent reason" to combine or modify prior art references is quite
different in character, and much easier to establish, than the pre-KSR
Federal Circuit requirement of "clear and convincing evidence"
supporting "specific findings showing a teaching, suggestion, or
"'135
motivation to combine prior art teachings ....
B. Disapproved Aspects of Federal Circuit Precedent
In reaffirming that 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is "based on the logic of
the earlier decision in Hotchkiss . . . and its progeny,"' 136 and that "the
principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the 'functional approach'
of Hotchkiss,"'' 37 the KSR decision rejects a core if typically unstated
129. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
130. Id. at 1740.
131. Id. at 1741 (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)).
132. Id. at 1739.
133. Id. at 1740-41(emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1742 (emphasis added).
135. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007).
136. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
137. Id. at 1739.
[Vol. 24
KSR IT WAS NOT A GHOST
premise of pre-KSR Federal Circuit precedent interpreting § 103. That
premise was to presuppose that every patent applicant, by the mere
act of filing a patent application, was automatically vested with a
provisional entitlement to patent protection for any process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter that he or she might disclose and
claim to be an "invention," no matter what its nature.138 Section 103,
on this view, operated as a mere proviso to a presupposed entitlement
to patent protection.
In KSR, by contrast, the Court referred to and applied "the bar on
patents claiming obvious subject matter established in Hotchkiss and
codified in § 103.,,139 To qualify for patent protection under § 103 as
interpreted in KSR and prior Supreme Court decisions, subject matter
disclosed and claimed in a patent application must be deemed "non-
obvious subject matter," a characterization that is not simply
presupposed, but one that depends on a qualitative assessment of
whether more than "ordinary skill" was needed to devise claimed
means for achieving an objectively defined result. 140 Nothing in §
103(a) prevents the PTO or a reviewing court from concluding that a
patent applicant has failed, in the first instance, to demonstrate that he
or she was an "inventor" of "non-obvious subject matter," whether or
not evidence external to a patent application is advanced against an
alleged inventor's claim.
The KSR decision reaffirms the reasoning of a long line of
Supreme Court precedents dealing with "combination" patent claims.
"For over a half century, the Court has held that a 'patent for a
combination which only unites old elements with no change in their
respective functions... obviously withdraws what is already known
into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available
138. See supra notes 40 - 50 and accompanying text. Echoing the view stated in the text,
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) filed an amicus curiae brief in
KSR that argued that Sections 101 and 102 of the Patent Act "presume entitlement to a patent"
and "Section 103 functions only to limit this entitlement." Brief for American Intellectual
Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7 n. 10, KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2950592, *7 (emphasis
added). In fact, patent protection in the United States is limited by statute to subject matter that
constitutes an "invention or discovery," 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2000); a patent applicant must
swear to a belief that he or she is an "inventor," 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2000); and the PTO must
examine any "alleged new invention" (35 U.S.C. § 131(2000)) to determine if it meets "the
conditions and requirements of this title," 35 U.S.C § 101, one of which is "the § 103
condition." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
139 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
140. See id. ("[M]ounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was
a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art"). See also
supra notes 32 - 39 and accompanying text.
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to skillful men."",14 1 This aspect of the KSR decision rejects the
reasoning of Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.142 and Medtronic, Inc.
v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 143 in which the Federal Circuit had
stated "[i]t but obfuscates the law to posit a non-statutory, judge-
created classification labeled 'combination patents,"" 144  and
"[r]eference to 'combination' patents is, moreover, meaningless.'1 45
Contrary to the Federal Circuit's previously stated view, "[n]either the
141. Id. (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147
(1950)). See, e.g., Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-63 (1969)
(invalidating claim describing pre-existent asphalt spreader combined with pre-existent radiant
burner that together performed no "new or different function"; their combination "was not an
invention by the obvious-non-obvious standard"); Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts,
Inc., 307 U.S. 350, 356 (1939) (invalidating claims that recited pre-existing torch body and cap
structures that together "performed no joint function" but "served as separately it had done");
Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938) (invaliding patent claims
that recited pre-existing grease gun components together with novel pin fitting; stating, "[t]he
mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or
produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced
by them, is not patentable invention"); Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing
& Conveying Co., 282 U.S. 175, 186 (1930) (invalidating claims that recited pre-existing
structures suitable for transporting wet concrete, all of which structures "were old in the art" and
whose combination accomplished "no more than an aggregate of old results"); Grinnell
Washing Mach. Co. v. E.E. Johnson Co., 247 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1918) (invalidating claims that
recited pre-existing structures for driving a wringer washing machine, where the result produced
was "only that which arises from the well-known operation of each one of the elements");
Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U.S. 299, 302-03 (1895) (invalidating claims that recited
grain elevator apparatus; stating, "[s]o long as each element performs some old and well-known
function, the result is not a patentable combination, but an aggregation of elements"); Knapp v.
Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 227 (1893) (invalidating claims that recited adjustable dress form
structures; stating, "the combination of old elements which perform no new function and
accomplish no new results does not involve patentable novelty"); Brinkerhoff v. Aloe, 146 U.S.
515, 516-17 (1892) (invalidating claims that recited rectal specula; stating, "To sustain a patent
on a combination of old devices it is well-settled that a new result must be obtained which is due
to the joint and cooperating action of all the old elements. Either this must be accomplished, or a
new machine of distinct character and function must be constructed."); Adams v. Bellaire
Stamping Co., 141 U.S. 539, 542 (1891) (invalidating claims that recited pre-existing lantern
structures, where "[t]he elements combined to form the alleged invention merely constituted an
aggregation of old devices, each working out its own effect, without producing anything
novel,...."); Florsheim v. Schilling, 137 U.S. 64, 77 (1890) (invalidating claims that recited
corset structures; stating, "in a patentable combination of old elements, all the constituents must
so enter into it as that each qualifies every other.... It must form either a new machine of a
distinct character and function, or produce a result due to the joint and co-operating action of all
the elements, and which is not the mere adding together of the separate contributions. See also
Graham, 383 U.S. at 10 n.3 ("A man has a right to use a saw, an axe, a plane separately; may he
not combine their uses on the same piece of wood?") (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Oliver Evans (Jan. 1814), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, AT 298 (Washington ed.)).
142. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
143. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 1566.
145. Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1540 (emphasis added).
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enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court's
earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a
patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.'
'1 46
The KSR decision reaffirms that "[t]he ultimate judgment of
obviousness is a legal determination" that courts, not lay juries, have
the responsibility for making.1 47 KSR states that "[i]f a court, or patent
examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject
matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under § 103.,, 14' KSR further
states that "a court must ask whether the improvement is more than
the predictable use of prior art elements according to established
principles"149; "Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to
interrelated teachings of multiple patents";150 "a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would employ";' 5' "the district court can and should
take into account expert testimony"; 15 and "[t]o facilitate review, this
analysis should be made explicit."'
' 53
Under Graham, "the ultimate question of patent validity is one
of law.' 54 Not even the most elaborate of special jury verdict forms
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49 can yield an "explicit" "analysis" of whether
or why subject matter claimed in an issued patent should or should
not be deemed "non-obvious subject matter" as a legal matter.' 5  This
aspect of the KSR decision, which resolved the parties' competing
arguments as to the preemptive effect of prior art and reinstated a
summary judgment of invalidity, appears to reject the reasoning of
cases such as Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 56 in
which the Federal Circuit held that persons accused of patent
146. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007)
147. Id at 1745-46. See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372
(1996) ("[T]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively
within the province of the court.").
148. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1740 (emphasis added).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 1741 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 1741 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 1741.
154. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
156. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Federal Circuit precedent in this respect is in avowed conflict with regional circuit precedent.
Compare Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The court must, in
all cases, determine obviousness as a question of law independent of the jury's conclusion")
with Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 895 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting Sarkisian as making
"charades of motions for directed verdict or JNOV under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 in patent cases").
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infringement had no right to independent judicial, as opposed to lay
jury, determination of the ultimate question of validity under § 103.157
The KSR decision reaffirms that multiple prior art references can
render claimed subject matter "obvious," and thus unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in many more and different circumstances than
the Federal Circuit had acknowledged between 1983 and at least
2005.158 After KSR, as before, a pre-existent teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine or modify prior art references is one basis on
which a court may deem claimed subject matter "obvious" for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 159 To this extent, "[t]here is no
necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test
and the Graham analysis.' 60 That "idea" is that in some cases, "it can
be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person
of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the
way the new invention does."'1 61 The Court cited United States v.
Adams 162 as an example of such a case.
But after KSR, the absence of a pre-existent teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine or modify prior art is no longer fatal to a
defense of invalidity under § 103(a). This is a profound change from
prior Federal Circuit precedent. Under KSR, the presence or absence
of a pre-existent teaching, suggestion, or motivation to make claimed
subject matter is simply one factor that may provide a sound reason
for concluding that claimed subject matter should or should not be
deemed "non-obvious subject matter" and thus eligible for a grant of
government-backed rights to exclude. In a case like KSR, where the
claimed subject matter was a response to an exogenous development
(namely, a transition from mechanical to electronic throttle controls in
the automotive industry), the absence of a pre-existent teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine or modify prior art may have
little or no bearing on the degree of skill that was needed to react to
the new conditions and make at least some subject matter that falls
157. As noted above (see supra note 61-63 and accompanying text), besides permitting lay
juries to decide ultimate legal questions of validity under § 103(a), pre-KSR Federal Circuit
precedent also treated jury verdicts on ultimate questions of patent validity as if they were
general verdicts subject to extremely deferential and limited post-verdict or appellate review.
158. See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57526
(Oct. 10, 2007).
159. E.g., Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U.S. 291, 296 (1948) (prior art suggested
claimed improved anti-perspirant; claims held invalid).
160. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
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within the scope of a broadly worded patent claim. "In many fields it
may be that there is little discussion of obvious techniques or
combinations, and it often may be the case that market demand, rather
than scientific literature, will drive design trends."'' 63
The KSR decision expressly disapproves, as "error," long-
standing Federal Circuit precedent holding that "a patent claim cannot
be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of
elements was 'obvious to try."" 64 KSR makes clear that in appropriate
circumstances, "the fact that a combination was obvious to try might
show that it was obvious under § 103. ' '165
The KSR decision calls into question the Federal Circuit's long-
standing interpretation of the statutory presumption of patent
validity 166 as a presumption that "is never annihilated, destroyed, or
even weakened, regardless of what facts are of record."'167 The
defense of invalidity in KSR was grounded in part on a prior art
adjustable pedal system, Asano, that had never been cited to the PTO
during the prosecution of the patent-in-suit and whose preemptive
effect had never been considered or passed on by PTO during the
prosecution of the Engelgau patent 168 Despite this, the KSR plaintiffs
argued that the statutory presumption of validity required the Court to
test the sufficiency of KSR's invalidity proofs and legal arguments by
reference to a "clear and convincing evidence" standard.169
163. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
164. Id. at 1742 (quoting Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cit.
2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)).
165. Id.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
167. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added).
168. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737 ("Asano was not mentioned in the patent's prosecution" and
"the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point.").
169. Imprecise usage of the phrase, "clear and convincing evidence," has led to much
confusion in the field of patent law. Properly understood, the phrase "clear and convincing
evidence" refers to a quantum of evidence that produces, in the mind of afactinder, an abiding
conviction that the truth of a factual matter is highly probable. See supra note 56. The concept
of "clear and convincing evidence" has no proper application to the probability that a legal
conclusion -such as non-obviousness-should be deemed to follow from established historical
facts. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("[W]e find it inappropriate to speak in terms of a particular standard of proof being necessary
to reach a legal conclusion."). Further, under Supreme Court patent precedent, legal conclusions
of the type typically rendered by individual Examiners, in ex parte examination proceedings
under 35 U.S.C. § 131 enjoy very little, if any, deference. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 34 (1966) ("We are at a loss to explain the Examiner's allowance on the basis of such a
distinction."). See also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (rejecting patent licensee
estoppel doctrine, in part because "the Patent Office is often obliged to reach its decision in an
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In rendering its judgment of invalidity, the Court in KSR held
that it "need not reach the question whether the failure to disclose
Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids the presumption of
validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the
presumption."'' 70 But the Court added the following, very suggestive
comment: "We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the
rationale underlying the presumption - that the PTO, in its expertise,
has approved the claim - seems much diminished here."' 7' The
Court's statement recalls the general administrative law principle that:
"[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has ... entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem ... 72
Finally, the KSR decision appears to affirm the principle, often
expressed in Supreme Court patent precedents, that the "commercial
success" of a claimed invention may support a legal conclusion of
patentability "only in a close case where all other proof leaves the
question of invention in doubt."'' 73 Teleflex had argued that the
claimed invention of the Engelgau patent had enjoyed "commercial
success," but the Court nevertheless held: "Where, as here, the
content of the prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of
ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the
ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the arguments which could be advanced by parties
interested in proving patent invalidity").
170. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745.
171. Id.
172. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
173. Dow Chem. Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 330 (1945).
See also Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976) ("These desirable benefits
'without invention will not make patentability."') (quoting Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950)); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 n.4
(1976) ("Commercial success without invention will not make patentability.") (quoting Great
Atl., 340 U.S. at 153)). Compare Digitronics Corp. v. N. Y. Racing Ass'n, Inc., 553 F.2d 740,
748-49 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Any theory that 'secondary' considerations must be given weight before
a determination of obviousness can be made was laid to rest in Sakraida .... ) with Stevenson v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 546, 553 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (expressly rejecting Digitronics
and its interpretation of Sakraida). On this as on so many other issues, the enactment of
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) had the effect of terminating what had been, in the author's view, healthy
and valuable debate among intermediate appellate courts over the proper interpretation of the
Patent Act and of Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Act. Although conflicts between
Federal Circuit and pre-1982 regional circuit precedent may still be a basis for Supreme Court
review, see Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998), the KSR case illustrates how error
in Federal Circuit precedent can, under existing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), persist literally for
decades.
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obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors,
summary judgment is appropriate."' ' 74
The Court noted that in two decisions handed down in 2006,
Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co. 175 and Alza Corp v.
Mylan Labs., Inc.,176 the Federal Circuit had "elaborated a broader
conception of the TSM test than was applied in the instant matter."'
' 77
The Court declined to consider whether those decisions - both issued
after certiorari had been granted in KSR-"may describe an analysis
more consistent with our earlier precedents and our decision here."'
' 78
In fact, the Dystar panel majority had purported to enforce the same
restrictions on district court authority as had been articulated and
applied in the now reversed Federal Circuit decision in KSR, and went
so far as to explain and defend the Federal Circuit's KSR decision in a
published opinion issued six weeks before oral argument in KSR was
scheduled to occur.
179
C. The Court's Reinstatement of Summary Judgment of
Invalidity
The practical importance of the KSR decision is perhaps best
illustrated by what the Court actually did with the particular patent
claim that was asserted in the KSR case itself: the Supreme Court
reinstated a summary judgment of invalidity on the basis of evidence
that the Federal Circuit held did not make out even "a prima facie
case of obviousness."' 80 The Supreme Court stated, "[w]hen we apply
the standards we have explained to the instant facts, claim 4 must be
found obvious."'181 Consistent with the text of 35 U.S.C. § 282,182 the
174. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745-46 (emphasis added).
175. Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (2006).
176. Alza Corp v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
177. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745.
178. Id.
179. See Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1367 n.3.
180. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR lnt'l Co., 119 F.App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
181. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743.
182. "The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on
the party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). The statute makes no reference to
"clear and convincing evidence," By contrast, Congress has specified a "clear and convincing
evidence" burden of proof with respect to one particular invalidity defense that was added to the
Patent Act in 1999. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (2000) ("A person asserting the defense under
this section shall have the burden of establishing the defense by clear and convincing
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Court's past treatments of § 103-based invalidity defenses, and
principles of neutrality that prevail in civil litigation between private
parties generally,'8 3 the Court in KSR described the factual predicates
of the defendant/petitioner's defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§
103(a) and 282(2) without reference to "clear and convincing
evidence" or any other heightened burden of proof.
18 4
The validity of the patent claim at issue in KSR depended on the
preemptive effect of multiple prior art references. Applying its own
precedents, the Federal Circuit in KSR had held that a trial was
needed to determine the preemptive effect of undisputed prior art
references because, in its view, "[m]otivation to combine is a question
of fact" 185 even when, as in the KSR case, the prior art references
relied upon are all admittedly within the field of endeavor of a
claimed invention and there is no dispute as to their contents. The
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and treated the preemptive
effect of prior art as being an aspect of "[t]he ultimate judgment of
obviousness," a "judgment" that the Court characterized as a "legal
determination" and thus resolvable on a motion for summary
judgment.' 86 The plaintiffs' assertion that a hypothetical person
having ordinary skill in the art would have lacked "motivation" to
choose a particular reference, "Asano," as a basis for making the
claimed invention, was treated in the same fashion as any other
unpersuasive legal argument: "The idea," the Court held, "makes little
sense."187
In the Court's view, the patent claim at issue in KSR was invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as a matter of law because "[a] person
evidence.").Cf KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118
(2004) (where Congress uses language in one section of a statute but not in another, the
omission is presumed to be intentional). See also FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION & PATENT & POLICY, ch. 5, at 28 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O3/l0/innovationrpt.pdf (stating, with reference to the
burden of proof an accused patent infringer must meet in order to establish a defense of
invalidity, "there is no persuasive reason why the level of that burden should be clear and
convincing evidence.").
183. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
184. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735-36. See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 254 (1986) ("[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.") Thus, although
KSR was decided in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court's
decision necessarily took account of the "substantive evidentiary burden" that applied to the
defendant/petitioner's defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 103(a) and 282(2).
185. Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
186. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745.
187. Id. at 1742.
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having ordinary skill in the art could have combined Asano with a
pedal position sensor in a fashion encompassed by claim 4, and would
have seen the benefits of doing so."' 188 The Court then proceeded to
identify a series of "errors" that had led the Federal Circuit to vacate
the district court's award of summary judgment of invalidity.
The Federal Circuit's "first error" was its "holding that courts
and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee
was trying to solve."' 89 This approach failed to recognize that a
"problem" subjectively perceived by a particular patent applicant
"may be only one of many addressed by the patent's subject
matter."'190 "In determining whether the subject matter of a patent
claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed
purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach
of the claim."'191
The Federal Circuit's "second error," the Court held, "lay in its
assumption that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a
problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to
solve the same problem."' 192 "Common sense teaches," the Court
stated, "that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be
able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle."1
93
The Federal Circuit's third "error," the Court held, lay in its
conclusion that "a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by
showing that the combination of elements was 'obvious to try." 1 94 As
noted above, the Court held that in some cases a showing that claimed
subject matter was "obvious to try" could be a legally sufficient
reason for concluding that it failed to meet the § 103 condition.' 95
Finally, the Court held that the Federal Circuit "drew the wrong
conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey
to hindsight bias."' 96 "A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the
188. Id. at 1743 (emphasis added). For a computer animation showing Asano combined with
a pedal position sensor, see http://www.ffhsj.com/index.cfm?pagelD=41&itemlD= 1050&sclD=65
189. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1741.
192. Id. at 1742.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co,, 119 F.App'x 282, 298 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments
reliant upon ex post reasoning."' 97 But this did not justify the Federal
Circuit's imposition of "[r]igid preventative rules that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense ...."198
Applying the principle that "any need or problem known in the
field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the
patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed,"' 99 the Court concluded, as a matter of law, that for purposes
of invalidity analysis, "it was possible to begin with the objective to
upgrade Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle ...."200
The Court then analyzed, as a legal question, whether achieving the
posited objective would have been within "the grasp" of a
hypothetical person having "ordinary skill in the art," 20' and thus
"obvious" to him or her in legal terms, in view of prior art disclosing
both (a) "self-contained, modular sensors" that were "designed
independently of a given pedal" so that they could be "taken off the
shelf and attached to mechanical pedals of various sorts, enabling the
pedals to be used in automobiles with computer-controlled
throttles,"20 2 and (b) fixed position pedal systems in which modular
sensors had been attached to an accelerator's support bracket and
engaged with the pedal's pivot shaft in the manner disclosed and
claimed in the Engelgau patent.20 3
The Court concluded that "mounting a modular sensor on a fixed
pivot point of the Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp
of a person or ordinary skill in the relevant art." 204 Positing an
objective or result to be achieved, such as "to upgrade Asano," and
inquiring whether claimed means of achieving the desired result
reflected "a design step well within the grasp of a person for ordinary
skill in the relevant art,' 205 exemplifies the skill-based "functional
approach" to patentability that the Court first announced in Hotchkiss
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 1745.
201. Id. at 1744.
202. Id. at 1736.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 1746.
205. Id.
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v. Greenwood,2 °6 and that the Court has now once again held was
"codified in § 103. "207
VI. CONCLUSION
The KSR decision does not purport to make new law. The
decision reaffirms and applies principles that the Court has articulated
and applied in numerous of its patent precedents dating back to 1851.
It therefore remains an open question whether, and to what extent, the
KSR decision will be held to entitle a party to review of a lower
court's non-application of Supreme Court patent precedent in the
absence of a timely exception - as was made in the KSR case. An
appellate court generally will not consider legal arguments for
reversal that were available, but not presented to, a lower court.
Between 1851 and 1976, the Supreme Court handed down a very
large number of decisions addressing core patent law issues, including
dozens of "judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss
condition .... ,,208 These precedents provide a rich source of reasons,
principles, and analogies for deciding whether, in a given case,
claimed subject matter is properly deemed "non-obvious subject
matter," or not. It is reasonable to expect that Supreme Court patent
precedent will play an increased role in the Federal Circuit's
interpretation and application of § 103 going forward. But in order for
Supreme Court patent precedent to play such a role, litigants must
give it voice.
206. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
207. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
208. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
2007]
* * *
